First Air Raid of WWII – 38

603 Squadron – lessons learned

The 603 ORB for 16 October recorded:
Enemy Air Raid of 12 Aircraft attacked naval vessels, dropping some 40 bombs near the Forth Bridge, from 14.30 to 16.30 hours.

Red Section shot down 1 enemy aircraft (thought to be a Heinkel 111) East of Dalkeith. Aircraft fell into the sea at Port Seton. Enemy aircraft believed to be one of three intercepted by Yellow Section. 3 prisoners were rescued from crew of 4.

Yellow Section intercepted 3 enemy aircraft near Dalkeith and despite the fact that the enemy aircraft broke formation and took advantage of clouds, rounds were fired at each one of them. L1048 received 1 bullet through the top engine cover Damage to enemy not known

Intercepted one enemy aircraft thought to be a Heinkel 111 over Rosyth at very low height. Enemy pursued out to sea with starboard engine not running, and return fire from rear gunner suspended.

Patrolled North Berwick and later Rosyth but did not sight enemy

Section did not intercept but F/O Boulter became detached and delivered an attack on Heinkel 111 flying East from Aberdour. Result of attack not known. Thick ground haze which, accentuated by bright sun, made weather more use to the enemy than us.

Cumulus: 5/ 10-6/ 10 to 6.000 feet.

The pilots of both 602 and 603 Squadrons learned a great deal on 16 October 1939. It was felt that the enemy camouflage was more effective than that of the RAF. Some pilots thought that the anti-aircraft fire provided an indication as to the whereabouts of the enemy bombers, but that to continue to attack whilst they were still amongst the puffs of exploding anti-aircraft shells was obviously fraught with danger. The subsequent interrogation of Storp and his crew revealed that they had great respect for the Spitfire and were fearful of it in combat.

It was recorded in the 13 Group Operational Record Book that the Spitfire pilots were learning to compensate for the ‘downward kick’ of the aircraft when the guns were fired. Whilst a nucleus of experienced pilots in the Squadron had amassed a great many hours flying, since they had been re-equipped with the Spitfire, live firing opportunities had been scarce and marksmanship was therefore unquestionably poor, despite many of the pilots having been to 7 ATS at Acklington for live firing off Druridge Bay the day before!

The pilots were also at a disadvantage with outmoded tactics which had evolved during a previous era of aerial combat. With statistics to work with, the gunnery experts at Fighter Command made an important discovery. The arrangement of the guns mounted in the wings was such that their fire converged at a point 400 yards in front of the aircraft, but it was the inaccuracy of the guns themselves, caused by slight movement in the mountings (gun chatter), the recoil from which caused the nose of the aircraft to drop by five degrees, and the loss of velocity of the ammunition when firing from such a great distance, which conspired to cause the bullets to spread out over an area of approximately 18 feet by 36 feet by the time they reached this point. It was calculated that this gave a density of 7 or 8 bullets per square foot and this was reduced yet further when shooting with deflection. The calculated density was actually massively overstated. Nevertheless, such dispersed fire was insufficient to cause lethal damage to an enemy aircraft particularly if passing through it at high speed. The guns were therefore re-harmonised to a point 250 yards ahead (producing a 9 x 13 foot spread). Thus the effects of inaccuracy at this shorter range were reduced and a much more concentrated area of fire was achieved.  However, long before this advice was passed on to the squadrons and at a time when unauthorised re-harmonisation of the guns was a court martial offence, many experienced pilots had ordered their ground crews to re-harmonise the guns for 250 yards and in some cases even less in order to maximise effectiveness. The success of 603 during the Battle of Britain, still nine months away, signalled a vast improvement in aircraft handling and marksmanship which was thanks largely to the dedication of George Denholm who committed himself to ensuring his pilots continued to improve their flying skill, including formation attacks and dogfighting.